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OF THE 
This case involves unpaid wages owed by the City of Lapwai to its former employee, 
Mercedes Turner. The District Court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, ruling 
the notice provided to the City by Ms. Turner regarding her claim was technically deficient. The 
District erred two primary reasons. First, the alleged technical deficiencies 
District Court were not, in fact, deficiencies; Ms. Turner's notice complied with Idaho law. Second, 
even assuming arguendo the validity ofthe alleged technical deficiencies cited by the District Court, 
the City had actual notice, and was not in fact misled, regarding Ms. Turner's claims, thereby 
rendering Ms. Turner's notice substantively effective. For these reasons, the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the City should be reversed. 
B. Procedural History 
Ms. Turner filed her complaint against the City of Lapwai on December 21, 2012. (R Vol. 
I, pp. 4-9.) The City moved for summary judgment on all of Ms. Turner's claims on July 13,2013. 
(R Vol. I, pp. 15-16.) The District Court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on 




Ms. was by to serve as its treasurer 
I, p. 62, .,-r2.) Ms. Turner was also compensated for duties performed for the City's water, sewer, and 
street departments. VoL I, .) Ms. Turner agreed with the City Council and David Fazzio, 
then the City's mayor, that Ms. Turner would be paid an annual salary on the basis of a thirty-five 
hour work week, I, p. at addition to 
Fazzio and the City Council agreed that Ms. Turner would accrue compensatory time ("comp time") 
at a one-to-one ration for every hour that she worked in excess of her required thirty-five hours 
during a given work week. (R Vol. I, p. 63, at .,-rS.) Ms. Turner's comp time would be paid at the 
rate equal to her hourly salary up to 40 hours, and at a rate of 1.S times her hourly salary for over 40 
hours. (R VoL I, p. 63, at .,-rS.) Ms. Turner's comp time was to be paid upon her termination or 
departure from employment with the City. (R Vo1. I, p. 63, at .,-rS.) At the time this agreement was 
made, the City was suffering a budgetary crisis, and Mr. Fazzio and Ms. Turner agreed that comp 
time, in lieu of overtime pay, would benefit the City fiscally because the City would not have to 
compensate Ms. Turner for all her overtime during each pay period. (R Vol. I, p. 63, at .,-r6.) 
Ms. Turner was a often working long hours, nights, and weekends due to 
""-'UHL. ... ,U state 
APPELLANT'S 
to to City's I, 
at to drive to to purchases, at own expense, 
necessary for the basic functioning of the City. (R Vol. I, p. 63, at ~9.) 
Ms. Turner's employment with the City ended in January 2011. (R Vol. I, 6 3, at ~l 
At the conclusion of her employment with the City, Ms. Turner was owed compensation for 84 hours 
of wages, 611 of comp time. I, at 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 7 
ON 
err CUBUlU'-) judgment? 
v. FEES ON 
Ms. Turner has claimed fees in this case pursuant to I.C. 45-615(2), 12-1 and 1 121, 
and LR.C.P. 54(d). 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Appellate Review 
"When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this Court is 
the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is 
appropriate if 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter oflaw.'" Intermountain Real Properties, LLCv. Draw, LLC, 155 Idaho 313, 
311 P.3d 734, 737 (2013) (quoting LR.C.P. 56( c». To the extent there exist disputed facts, they 
"should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." !d. 
B. Analysis 
as a matter 
(l I, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8 
1, to 




purposes creating '-'''-''L' .. .H-U.HU''H notice to 
the City" regarding her claim (R Vol. I, p. 124), was nonetheless technically deficient for five 
reasons: (1) the notice failed to state the amount of her claim (R Vol. I, pp. 124, 125); the notice 
failed to explicitly state that Ms. Turner would file suit against the City ifher claim was not satisfied 
I, pp. 1 125); was not the I, p. 122); 
the notice failed to provide Ms. Turner's address (R Vol. I, p. 122); and (5) the notice failed to 
provide information regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding Ms. Turner's claim (R VoL 
I, p. 122). 
The District Court erred for two reasons. First, the alleged technical deficiencies cited by 
the District Court were not, in fact, deficiencies; Ms. Turner's notice complied with Idaho law. 
Second, even assuming arguendo the validity of the alleged technical deficiencies cited by the 
District Court, the City and actual notice, and was not in fact misled, regarding Ms. Turner's claims, 
thereby rendering Ms. Turner's notice substantively effective. For these reasons, the District Court's 




presented to or 1 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9 
§ 
arose or must gIven 
Idaho § 6-907 sets the contents requirements for a notice 
All claims presented to and filed with a governmental entity shall 
accurately describe the conduct and circumstances which brought 
about the injury or damage, describe the injury or damage, state the 
time and place the injury or damage occurred, state the names of all 
persons involved, ifknown, and shall contain the amount of damages 
claimed, together with a statement the 
claimant at the time 0 fpresenting filing claim and a period 
of six (6) months immediately prior to the time the claim arose .... 
A claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held 
invalid or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, 
place, nature or cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown 
that the governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby. 
tort 
The purpose ofthe Tort Claims Act's notice requirement is to "(1) save needless expense and 
litigation by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution ofthe differences between parties, (2) 
allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to determine the 
extent ofthe state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses." Pounds v. Denison, 
120 Idaho 425, 426-27 (1991) (quoting Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 401 (1981». 
2. Ms. Turner's Notice Clearly Stated the Amount of Her Claim. 
The District Court ruled that Ms. Turner's notice was technically deficient because it failed 
to present amount of her claim to City: are u."'."."'VUL for purposes notice 
because I" lI"lIl!" "" 
pay was " I, no 
APPELLANT'S BRlEF - 10 
amounts she was J"''-'''-HJl>', " I, 125.) 
relies not set specific amounts the Plaintiff was seeking[.]" 
Idaho Code § 6-907 requires that notice "shall contain the amount of damages claimed." The 
District Court erred because the amount of Ms. Turner's claim against the City was clearly stated 
in several places in her January 20, 2011 check request; the voided check prepared by Ms. Turner 
IS in the amount 1,111 exact amount 
she was owed by the City. (R Vol. I, p. 66.) The voided check, under "Statement of Eaming and 
Deductions", broke down Ms. Turner's total claim of $31,111.26 with greater specificity: 
84 regular hours claimed, at the hourly rate of$32.0640, totaling $2,963.33; 
611 vacation hours claimed, at the hourly rate of$32.0640, totaling $19,591.10; 
898.25 comp time hours claimed, at the hourly rate of $32.0640, totaling $28,801.49; 
Taxable deductions totaling $19,974.71. 
(R Vol. I, p. 66.) 
The City confirmed that it was aware of the amount claimed by Ms. Turner. In his March 
21, 2011 letter to Ms. Turner, Mayor Hernandez stated: 
This letter is to inform you the City of Lapwai is currently 
reviewing your final request for reimbursement 
time and other reimbursable items. 
A..PPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1 
amount 
claim. received check, reviewed 
Ms. Turner the amounts not in dispute, and then submitted the remaining disputed amount to an 
outside accounting service for review. (R Vol. I, .) The letter goes on to refer to the "entity 
[sic] of the requested compensation." (R Vol. I, p. 8a) It is evident that the City's reference to Ms. 
"requested compensation" necessarily means that Turner informed of the 
amount she claimed she was owed thereby. 
3. Idaho Law does not Require any "Magic Words" Regarding Future Legal 
Action in a Tort Claim Notice. 
The District Court ruled that Ms. Turner's notice was technically deficient because it failed 
to explicitly state that Ms. Turner would file suit against the City ifher claim was not satisfied: "Nor 
do the letters inform the City that Turner was planning to file suit against the City if she did not 
receive compensation for those requested items." (R Vol. I, p. 124.) "Nor did Turner ever indicate 
to the City that she would pursue a claim in court in the event the City did not comply with her 
requests." (R Vol. I, p. 125.) "Nor do (documents the Plaintiff relies upon] adequately put the City 
on notice that Turner would file suit if the payments were not made." (R Vol. I, 125.) 
District Court erred because Idaho law does not any "magic regarding 
a tort claim 1S 
must an or 
BRIEF - 12 
1'\nF'ClrQ to "'--' VLun.''"' this "magic 
case v. State: "Although herein were Cln,..,Clrp,,, 
investigated and reports thereof were filed, nevertheless there is no indication that the State could 
have even suspected it might be subject to a claim." 96 Idaho 711, 716 975). 
Read in context, this statement in Newlan in no way adds a "magic words" regarding future 
to Idaho tort claim notice law. In the were 
of a driver killed in a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by inappropriate paving materials 
specified by the Idaho Department of Highways. Id. at 712. The incident occurred on June 1, 1971. 
Id. The State investigated the accident and filed a report thereon. !d. at 716. The plaintiffs, 
however, took no action until they filed a notice of tort claim nearly two years later, on May 24, 
1973. Id. at 712. The plaintiffs sued the State one week later, on June 1, 1973. Id. The trial court 
dismissed the suit because the notice of tort claim was untimely,1 and the plaintiffs appealed. Id. 2 
After first ruling that the 120-day limitations period for the filing of notice of a tort claim was 
not unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, Id. at 714, the Supreme Court considered the 
appellant's argument that their suits should not be dismissed, notwithstanding the untimely tort claim 
1 
it was 
at7 6. argument, cited v. 
(1969), for the proposition that a plaintiff who gives no tort claim notice may nonetheless pursue a 
suit if the State or municipal entity had actual notice of the plaintiffs injury. Newlan, 
716. 
Idaho at 
Supreme argument, ruling that the weight of authority requires 
a plaintiff to demonstrate "some action of some type taken or attempted by the plaintiffs within the 
statutory notice period showing at least some compliance with the notice requirement. ... None of 
those cases appear to cover a situation where a plaintiff took no action whatsoever within the 
statutory period." Id. 
Applying this rationale, the Supreme Court found that indeed, the Newlans took no action 
whatsoever during the statutory notice period. Id. The Supreme Court then rejected the argument 
that the State's own investigation of, and actual notice regarding, the motor vehicle accident could 
obviate the requirement that a plaintiff or claimant must take their own, proactive steps to put the 
State on notice of a potential claim against it: "Although the accidents involved herein were 
apparently investigated and 1"'pr'£'>r1'C thereof were filed, nevertheless there is no Hn.)"v~LHV'H that 




proactively and independently submitted three different documents to the City, undisputedly during 
the statutory notice U..,'"'VIJ. that clearly detailed her claim. (See Turner's (1) January 20,2011 
check request (R I, pp. 66-74); February 1, 2011 letter to Mayor Hernandez (R Vol. I, p. 76); 
to ULH,LH'UL Smith I, pp. 
Unlike the Newlan plaintiffs, Ms. Turner's own actions and documents put the City on notice 
of her claim against it; Ms. Turner does not rely on the City's own investigation or some other form 
of actual notice in order to satisfy the notice requirements ofI.C. §§ 50-219 and 6-907. The District 
Court cites no further authority, and Ms. Turner has located none, supporting the proposition that 
a notice oftort claim that does not use "magic words" regarding future legal action is deficient. 
Furthermore, even if"magic words" were required, Ms. Turner threatened future action and 
proceedings if her claim was not satisfied. In her letter to City Councillor Antonio Smith, Ms. 
Turner stated: 
Lastly I am making a request for payment of my vacation and comp-
time pay. I was forced to file a claim with the US [sic] Department 
I am sure Mayor will be hearing from them soon 
I hated to file a claim but it has been over a 
City. 
statement can no was 
The District Court ruled Ms. Turner's notice was deficient because it was not filed with 
the City clerk: "However, these letters were not filed with the city clerk .... " (R Vol. I, p. 122.) 
Idaho Code § 6-906 requires that notice "be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary 
political claim arose or reasonably should 
been discovered. The District Court erred because Ms. Turner's notice was provided to, and 
received by, City officials of greater rank and authority than the City clerk. Ms. Turner provided 
notice ofher claim to Mayor Hernandez (R Vol. I, p. 76) and City Councillor Antonio Smith (R Vol. 
I, p. 77-79). Mayor Hernandez continned receipt of Ms. Turner's notice by writing Ms. Turner on 
March 21, 2011 and infonning her that the: 
City of Lapwai is currently reviewing your final request for 
reimbursement of comprehensive time and other reimbursable items. 
The City has retained an outside accounting service to assist in our 
review of your request. To date, we have provided you with the 
amount that is not in dispute, but until the completion of this review 
we will be unable to provide you with the entity [sic] ofthe requested 
compensation. 
(R Vol. I, p. 80.) Mayor Hernandez's statements undisputedly demonstrate that Ms. Turner's notice 
was received, to her claim. 
- 6 
to 
same notice to UUJ""-'Uon to 
would have been sufficient. It is, however, the ultimate triumph of form over substance to hold 
notice defective simply because it is transmitted directly to the relevant decision maker, with receipt 
confirmed thereby, rather than through an intermediary and from then on to the decision maker. In 
case the IS up in the hands ofthe decision 
maker, as was undisputedly the case here as demonstrated by Mayor Hernandez's March 21,2011 
letter to Ms. Turner. 
Indeed, this form over substance approach was rejected in Huff v. Uhf, 103 Idaho 274 (1982). 
In Huff, the plaintiff claimed damages against the Minidoka Irrigation District. Id. at 275. The 
plaintiff personally provided notice of the claim, in the form of repair estimates, to the receptionist 
at the Minidoka Irrigation District. Id. The receptionist then immediately and undisputedly gave 
the notice to the irrigation district's secretary treasurer. Id. The irrigation district argued that the 
notice was defective because it was given to a receptionist, not to the "clerk or secretary of the 
political subdivision" as required by I.e. § 6-906. at 276. This argument was rejected: 
It is difficult us to see more could be called for. Certainly, 
as long as the notice is delivered to secretary's office, it is 
to 
at 276-77. 
BRIEF - 17 
Similarly, v. 27 
argument that a from a to City of 
Sandpoint, constituted insufficient notice. The letter was not specifically addressed to the city clerk, 
but only to "City Sandpoint" generally. at 32. "This letter from the Cox's attorney and 
addressed to the City describes the conduct circumstances which brought about a claimed injury 
to " 
The plaintiff in Huff undisputedly provided notice to a receptionist, and not to the "clerk or 
secretary of the political subdivision" as required by I.e. § 6-906. The Supreme Court nonetheless 
ruled that the notice was sufficient. Huff thus stands for the proposition that § 6-906 need not be 
exactly followed as long as the claim undisputedly comes to the attention of those decision makers 
ultimately responsible for the claim's disposition. Such is the case of Ms. Turner's notice. Even 
though Ms. Turner did not provide direct notice to the acting City clerk, Mayor Hernandez's March 
20, 2011 letter undisputedly demonstrates that Ms. Turner's notice was received by those with the 
authority to decide her claim because, as Mayor Hernandez's letter states, the City paid Ms. Turner 
a portion of her claimed wages, but was investigating the remainder of the claimed wages. 
The District Court cited the federal court case v. City afCaldwell, 769 
2d 1256 did 
not were 
to 
APPELLANT'S - 18 
Court's reliance on was this case are 
distinguishable from those and remain more to 
notice was provided to the fire chief. Though a fire chief is a city official, it is safe to assume that 
the fire chief does not have ultimate decision making authority regarding whether to pay a claim 
against the city, by use of city funds. By contrast, Ms. Turner's notice was provided to the Mayor, 
who actually had authority to decide, and indeed Turner's claim 
against the City, or a portion thereof, by use of City funds. Furthermore, the Brown case is devoid 
of evidence demonstrating that the mayor or clerk of the City of Caldwell had actual notice of the 
plaintiffs claims against the City of Caldwell. By contrast, Mayor Hernandez's March 20,2011 
letter to Ms. Turner undisputedly demonstrates that the City had actual notice of Ms. Turner's claim, 
decided to pay a portion thereof, and was reviewing the remainder of the claim. Just as in Huff, even 
if Ms. Turner's notice did not adhere to the exact requirements of § 6-906, the record undisputedly 
demonstrates that the notice in question was successfully delivered to those with the authority to 
assess the claim. 
5. Ms. Turner's Notice Contained her Address. 
The District Court ruled that Ms. Turner's notice was U'-'~~"'H.d~ because the notice failed to 
address: regarding 
" I, 1 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 19 
§ 6-907 a state at 
filing the claim for a to the 
time the claim arose .... " The District Court erred because Ms. Turner's notice included her 
address. The January 20, 2011 check request submitted by Ms. Turner includes her address: 1722 
Powers Avenue in Lewiston. (R Vol. I, p. 66.) The City undisputedly knew Ms. Turner's address 
City gave Turner on amounts 
not in dispute, also lists Ms. Turner's address as 1722 Powers Avenue in Lewiston. (R Vol. I, p. 75.) 
6. Ms. Turner's Notice Provided Sufficient Information Regarding the Facts 
and Circumstances Surrounding the Case. 
The District Court ruled that Ms. Turner's notice was deficient because it failed to provide 
information regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding Ms. Turner's claim: "[N)or did they 
contain statutorily-specified information regarding ... the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
case." (R Vol. I, p. 122.) 
Idaho Code § 6-907 requires that a notice "describe the conduct and circumstances which 
brought about the injury or damage, describe the injury or damage, state the time and place the injury 
or damage occurred, state the names of all persons involved, ifknown." District Court erred 
Ms. Turner's notice provided sufficient information 1""'<Y9 .. ,'11 circumstances 
case. 
BRIEF - 20 
) 
amounts her claim by regular, vacation, tax 
deductions. (R Vol. I, p. 66.) Accompanying the check request, Ms. Turner provided the City a 
leave time report (R Vol. I, p. 68), a leave time accrual register Vol. I, a vacation 
accrual register (R Vol. I, 70), and a payroll detail register (R Vol. I, 71-73). 
Turner's 1, 11 letter to Hernandez 
has "not received [her] final check form [sic] the City of Lapwai." (R Vol. I, p. 76.) 
Ms. Turner's February 28, 20111etier to City Councillor Smith (1) reiterates Ms. Turner's 
claim for vacation and comp time pay (R Vol. I, p. 78); (2) states that Ms. Turner has filed a claim 
with the U.S. Department of Labor (R VoL I, p. 78); (3) states Ms. Turner's belief that the City has 
had sufficient time to either pay her claim or explain why no payment will be forthcoming (R Vol. 
I, p. 78); (4) advises that all her time sheets have been signed (R Vol. I, pp. 78-79); (5) points out 
that every time Ms. Turner was paid bi-weekly, her accrued vacation and comp time hours were 
reflected on her pay stubs (R Vol. I, p. 79); (6) directs attention to the "prelist" reports regarding her 
time worked and previously used by the City auditor (R Vol. I, p. 79); and (7) invites the City to 




As discussed supra, the District Court erred in several specific ways. The District also 
erred in a far-reaching manner as well by not viewing Ms. Turner's notice in its entirety and 
considering whether the substance thereof was sufficient to satisfY § 6-907. Under Idaho law, notice 
IS deficient nonetheless satisfies § 6-907 unless 
that it was in fact misled regarding the claim. In essence, the District Court erred by engaging in a 
form over substance analysis when § 6-907 and Idaho precedent directs courts to do exactly the 
opposite and engage in a substance over form analysis. 
Significantly, § 6-907 includes a burden-shifting caveat indicating the legislative priority of 
substances over form: "A claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held invalid 
or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause of the claim, or 
otherwise, unless it is shown that the governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby." 
(emphasis added) See also Cox, 140 Idaho at 131 ("There is no express format for a claim under the 
ITCA."). The practical application of this caveat means that technically deficient notice may 
nonetheless satisfY § 6-907 unless the governmental entity affirmatively demonstrates that it was 
regarding alleged injury. 
City was ULl'-",,!-'U not 
2 , 
- 22 
reviewing your final request 
and other 
retained an outside accounting service to assist our 
review of your request. date, we have provided you with the 
amount that is not in dispute, but until the completion of this review 
we will be unable to provide you with the entity [sic] ofthe requested 
compensation. 
(R Vol. I, p. 80.) Mayor Hernandez's letter unequivocally demonstrates that Ms. Turner's notice 
was the it was aware Turner's s 
payment of a portion of Ms. Turner's claim and retention of an outside accounting firm to "assist in 
our review of your request" leaves no argument that the City was misled regarding, or ignorant of, 
Ms. Turner's claim. 
In keeping with the burden-shifting nature of § 6-907, Idaho courts have consistently applied 
a "substance over form" analysis to tort notices. In Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618 (1978), 
the plaintiff's insurer sent the City of Preston a letter outlining its subrogation claim against it based 
on an automobile accident suffered by the plaintiffthat was allegedly caused by the City of Preston' s 
failure to remove foliage obscuring a stop sign. Id. at 621. The City of Preston's insurance carrier 
responded to the letter, denying the SUbrogation. Id. The plaintiff sued the City of Preston, which 
argued the letter the plaintiff's insurer failed to technically satisfy 
engaged "substance over 
§ 
APPELLAl'JT'S - 23 
vU'.VU.'" enumerated s we contents 
of the letter were adequate light of the final proviso of that section 
which states that "(a) claim ... shall not be held invalid or 
insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, 
nature or cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the 
governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby." 
[d. Additionally, the Smith court noted that "[T]he reply by the city's insurance carrier indicates 
the ... was HvlvHC to notify city that a claim against it was being pursued to 
apprise the city of sufficient facts for it to investigate the matter, determine its merits and prepare 
a defense." Id. 
Similarly, in the Huff case discussed supra, the plaintiff was involved in an automobile 
accident wherein he was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by the Minidoka County Irrigation 
District. 103 Idaho at 275. Four days after the accident, the plaintiff went to the irrigation district 
office, told the receptionist there he had been in an accident with an irrigation district truck, and left 
a copy of the estimate to repair his car. Id. The irrigation district argued that the written repair 
estimate was technically deficient because it did not contain all the information required by § 6-907. 
Id. at 276. The court rejected this argument, ruling that "although the written estimate itself did not 
contain a statement demand, M.LD. was clearly apprised the fact that a claim was being 
prosecuted against court UUJeHL'..AL to fact 
matter it 
not engage of analysis cOlltamea 
"substance over tort claim was reiterated: 
recognize that there may be flaws in these notices of claim, but such flaws will render the notices 
insufficient only if the City 'was in fact misled to its injury thereby.'" 140 Idaho at 132. 
The facts surrounding Ms. Turner's notice are functionally identical to the facts ofbotYmith 
and cases, deficient and failed to 
6-907 to the letter. Indeed, the notices in Smith and Huff were quite informal; a repair estimate in 
the former and a subrogation letter in the latter. In both cases, however, the notice was deemed 
substantively sufficient to satisfy § 6-907 because the governmental entities were clearly and 
undisputedly aware of the claims against them. In this case, the March 21, 20 II letter from Mayor 
Hernandez to Mrs. Turner undisputedly demonstrated that the City was aware of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding Ms. Turner's claim and was not misled in relation thereto. Thus, even 
assuming arguendo the validity of the technical deficiencies noted by the District Court, the District 
Court erred by not continuing its § 6-907 analysis and deciding whether the City was in fact misled. 
Both Smith and Huffhold that ifthe City was not misled, then any alleged technical deficiencies in 
Ms. Turner's notice constitutes harmless error and are of no moment. 
two 
were 
APPELLANT'S - 25 
Second, even assuming validity 
alleged technical the Court, City actual was not 
fact misled, regarding Ms. Turner's claims, thereby rendering Ms. Turner's notice substantively 
effective. For these reasons, the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor the City 
should be reversed. 
day 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 26 
BRASSEY, CRAWFORD & HOWELL, PLLC 
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